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THE KENYA NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION
MONITORING PROJECT∗
AGENDA ITEM 3
RESOLVING THE POLITIAL CRISIS (POWER SHARING)
Report on Status of Implementation
January 2009

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

1. This report focuses on the status of implementation of Agenda Item 3 on power sharing,
which the National Accord underlined as important in resolving the political crisis. Data
on which this report is based was collected using a mix of methods. The baseline survey
shows opinions and perceptions about power sharing. The report covers the period
between March 2008 and January 2009. Our indicators for tracking progress on this
agenda item include the following:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Distribution of public sector positions.
Political cohesion in the coalition.
Coherence in decision making.
Conflict management within the coalition government.
Public satisfaction with the coalition government.

2. A point to note in this report is that power-sharing was not an end in itself; it was a means
to initiating a process that would lead to various reforms, including those that would
address the fundamental causes of the crisis. The Long-Standing issues are covered under
Agenda Item 4. The following are highlights of the findings on power sharing.
3. Internal conflict: Conflict between the parties that make up the coalition as well as within
the parties themselves were a feature of the coalition throughout the last quarter of 2008
and the beginning of January 2009. In particular, there have been debates on the powers
of the Office of the Prime Minister, vis-à-vis the Office of the Vice President and the
Office of the Head of Civil Service and Secretary to the Cabinet. Conflict between the
Office of the Prime Minister and the Office of the Head of Civil Service has been most
visible.
4. Some argue that the powers of the Head of Civil Service are in conflict with those of the
Prime Minister. ODM has consistently complained that it has no influence in Government
and that the Head of Civil Service has been undermining the Prime Minister. On its part,
PNU has argued that the position of the Permanent Secretary, Office of the President, is
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entrenched in the present Constitution and that the Head of Civil Service (the PS) is
performing his duties as required by the law.
5. The focus on the administrative powers and political hierarchy of these institutions
underscores the need to fast-track the constitutional review process. In the long-term, only
a new constitution will make the adjustments required to sustainably address the question
of power balance between these institutions. In the short-term, a ‘political’ solution needs
to be found that will overcome the conflict (or at least remove it from the public eye
where it is damaging the credibility of the Coalition Government).
6. Distribution of public sector positions: The parties to the National Accord seem to
interpret the principles of the National Accord from different perspectives. Some argue
that power is disproportionately distributed in favour of PNU and that ODM has no
influence within Government. Because of this, there is a strong perception that PNU has a
greater share of public positions and that the party does not want to share power. How
power should be shared between the coalition partners – and the type of public positions
to be shared – is an issue that can be effectively settled through constitutional reforms.
Administrative solutions will deepen the problem. Fast tracking and concluding the
constitutional review is an urgent matter.
7. Political Cohesion: Political cohesion remains largely unpredictable both between and
within the Coalition partners. Although internal intrigues are a characteristic of coalitions
the world over, the absence of cohesion within Kenya’s coalition is exacerbated by
diverse interests within individual political parties. To some members of the public, the
Coalition is a ‘two-in-one-government’.
8. Coherence in decision-making: The public perception of a ‘two-in-one-government’ is
often accentuated by lack of coherence in decision-making. There are times when
decisions are made but are received with hostility by a different group in the Coalition.
And where there are failures, the parties engage in blame games. However, there are both
cases of successful and failed decision-making in the Grand Coalition.
9. Conflict Management within the Coalition: The coalition parties did not sign a coalition
agreement. It is possible that conflict within the coalition would have been resolved with
ease if such an agreement was in place. A new Permanent Committee comprising
members from each party has been established to manage the affairs of the Coalition.
While this is a positive step, it is important that a written framework/ agreement for
managing the affairs of the Coalition is prepared and signed by the Partners.
10. Satisfaction with Grand Coalition: The level of public satisfaction with the Grand
Coalition is waning. The Government is perceived to lack commitment to major political
reforms and to effective public service delivery. There is a need to restore public
confidence and faith in the Grand Coalition.
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General conclusion
11. The Coalition Government is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end. The parties to
the National Accord had agreed that power sharing was critical to resolving the
fundamental causes of the crisis the country was facing. For this reason, the Coalition
partners’ attention should be on broad and comprehensive reforms, including the
constitutional review process itself. The public is beginning to question whether partners
in the Coalition Government act in the public interest. There is a growing perception that
this is a two in one government. The reform process needs to be prioritised through the
collective energy of the political leadership, gaining a momentum that will make delivery
unstoppable.
12. Conflicts within the coalition have meant lack of collective vision on reforms and that
commitment to reforms is not internalised. This has given room for anti-reform and nonreform forces at all levels to operate. This has also resulted in more divisions within the
coalition. It is important for the two principles to mobilise support for reforms within
parliament during parliamentary debates.
13. Internal conflicts both within the Coalition and in the parties that make up the Coalition,
have the potential of deflecting attention away from reforms to short-term interests.
Insulating the constitutional review process – and other institutional reforms – from the
intricacies of party politics is critical. A coalition agreement should be developed and
signed by the parties. This will assist in the management of the coalition.
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MAIN FINDINGS
INTRODUCTION
14. This report reviews the extent to which power sharing has been achieved or is being
achieved within the Grand Coalition. Selected indicators for reporting on power sharing
include percentage distribution of public sector positions; level of political cohesion; level
of coherence in decision-making; conflict management within the Grand Coalition and
level of satisfaction with the Coalition Government.
15. The report is based on data collected and analysed from secondary sources as well as
interviews with key informants. The report has also integrated findings from the national
baseline survey conducted in December 2008 to establish the benchmarks for monitoring
the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation agreement.
16. We begin by noting that it is almost a year since President Mwai Kibaki of the Party of
National Unity (PNU) and Prime Minister Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic
Movement (ODM) signed the National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement on
February 28, 2008. The National Accord recognised that the crisis revolved around issues
of power and the functioning of state institutions. The Constitution had to be amended to
provide for a coalition government.
17. In this report, we discuss progress in power sharing and the challenges the partners have
been experiencing. We note nonetheless that the parties have tended to interpret the
National Accord on the basis of their own perspectives and individual interests. This has
resulted in tensions within the Coalition to the extent that the momentum for the main
agenda for the Grand Coalition – implementing comprehensive reforms – is reducing.
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION
Distribution of power and sharing of public sector positions
18. We have already pointed out that sharing political power was crucial for ending the
political crisis. Thus, power sharing was not an end in itself. It was meant to facilitate the
initiation of broad-based reforms.
19. The National Accord devolved some executive powers to the new office of the Prime
Minister. These powers include the authority to appoint half of the Cabinet, and to
coordinate and supervise the functions of the Government, including those of ministries.
We note that amendments to the Constitution (to provide for this structure of power) were
made to address the political crisis at that moment. Therefore, the relationship of the new
office to the existing institutions such as the Office of the Vice President and the Office of
the Head of the Civil Service and Secretary to the Cabinet may not have received due
attention and analysis.
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20. Conflicts emanating from this relationship have negatively impacted on public
perceptions of power sharing within the Coalition. Notably, in the baseline survey, only
44% of Kenyans think that there is equal power sharing between the two Coalition
partners. Although 46% are satisfied with the way power is shared, 51% are dissatisfied.
21. There are several challenges facing ‘effective power sharing’ at this level. Some of the
analysts that we have interviewed argue that despite the constitutional amendment, the
President still retained more executive power and that it is difficult to tell the scope of
powers vested in the Prime Minister.1 Also, the National Accord created the Office of the
Prime Minister without redefining the role or scope of powers of other existing
institutions such as the Office the Vice-President and the Head of Civil Service. Those of
this view point out that the National Accord did not translate the full spirit of the Accord
into the letter of the law.2 Other challenges include power struggles between the Office of
the Prime Minister and Office of the Vice President3 and the Office of the Head of Public
Service;4 and the lack of trust and good faith between political parties to work together.5
22. What emerges here is that the distribution and exercise of executive power between the
two parties has assumed a pattern that does not carry the spirit of the National Accord
forward. The weaknesses in the National Accord have sometimes been exploited to cause
tensions within the Grand Coalition. Many Kenyans believed in the spirit of the National
Accord and are of the view that it is the Accord that has promoted calm and reduced
violence.
23. While all coalitions the world over experience similar problems, it is our view that a new
constitution will provide guidance on the future structure of government. It is important
that failings of the coalition inform the structure of government to be adopted in any new
constitution. However, short-term ‘process’ solutions are required to address this
immediate threat to the Accord (and the credibility of the Coalition), pending review of
the constitution.
Sharing of public sector positions
24. The National Accord underlined that ‘the composition of the coalition government shall
at all times reflect the relative parliamentary strength of the respective parties and shall at
all times take into account the principle of portfolio balance.’ There have been different
interpretations of this provision. It should be noted that lack of consensus on the meaning
of ‘portfolio balance’ has had its consequences in terms of public perceptions. Some of
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Interview with legal expert/analyst in Jan 2009.
Ibid.
3
The protocol wars between the two offices recently resurfaced during the debate on the proposed amendments to the
Parliamentary
Standing
Orders.
See
Hansard
Report
on
December
10,
2008.
Available
at:
2
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ODM party has constantly observed that the Head of Public Service has been “interfering in and undermining” the Prime
Minister’s office. In the past one month, there has been heated debate between the Coalition partners on whether or not to do
away with the position of the Head of Public Service. The PNU has strongly defended Amb. Francis Muthaura’s position
and work even as ODM continues to protest.
5
The baseline survey shows that 40% of Kenyans think political parties failing to work together is a stumbling block to
power sharing.
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these issues can be settled effectively through a comprehensive review of the constitution.
Administrative solutions will make these problems more complex and will lead to
political conflicts between the partners.
25. The baseline survey shows that 46% of Kenyans are satisfied with the way power is
shared between the two parties while 51% are not. While 44% of Kenyans think power is
shared equally between the two parties, about half (49%) do not think so. Of those who
think that one group has more power, 89% of them think that PNU has more power than
ODM. In all, 60% of the respondents think that some of the parties want more power.
Perceptions of disproportionate distribution of political power in the coalition appear to
be swaying public opinion. Negative perceptions on power sharing represent a threat to
future political stability.
26. The Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government anticipated that the formation
of the Coalition Government will at all times take into consideration the principle of
portfolio balance and partners’ relative parliamentary strength.6 In April 2008, a total of
92 Cabinet ministers and assistant ministers was agreed upon between the Coalition
partners and the positions shared equally at 50% each.7 Three Cabinet positions became
vacant and were filled in January.8 Although it is unclear why the President and the
Prime Minister took more than six months to do so, some observers read internal party
politics among the two Coalition partners as being responsible for the delay.9
27. The issue of portfolio balance in the distribution of Cabinet positions was critical at the
time of the formation of the Grand Coalition. Since then, no more changes have been
made in a bid to achieve portfolio balance at the Cabinet level. This could be an
indication that the Coalition partners are satisfied with the situation thus far. One senior
government official observes that some ministers who thought their ministries were less
strategic (in terms of portfolio balance) have been able to transform them into equally
significant ministries. Subsequently, this may mean that the weight of a portfolio depends
on the zeal of the office holder.
28. In terms of sharing high-level public sector positions (other than Cabinet), there have
been recurring disagreements between Coalition partners as to whether the principle of
portfolio balance applies or not. What has been observed over the past months is that
consultations and consensus between the two principals on any appointments is crucial
for allaying internal disagreements. For example, in October and November 2008, there
were reports in the media that the coalition partners were unable to agree on the
appointment of new ambassadors. ODM had claimed that it did not get its rightful share
of public sector positions. On January 15, 2009, President Kibaki appointed about 10
ambassadors following consultations with the Prime Minister. The names the two did not
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See Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government signed on February 28, 2008.

7

See Office of the President, 2008. Presidential Circular No. 1/2008: Organisation of the Government. Issued on May 30,
2008.
8
9

ODM had two vacancies following the death of two of its members and PNU 1 following the resignation of one member.
For instance, they see ODM as being captive to the Rift Valley ethnic bloc and it is unable to satisfy one bloc and leave out the other.
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agree on were shelved for later discussions.10 This latter approach indeed reflects the
spirit of the National Accord.
29. Coalition governments are sometimes formed to create a national government by
distributing public sector positions equitably to different ethnic groups in ethnically
divided societies. Although this was not expressly provided for in the National Accord, a
majority of Kenyans consider ethnicity as a pertinent factor in sharing election spoils. So
far, only 37% of Kenyans say that there is equitable distribution of civil service jobs
(ministries and parastatals) among various ethnic groups in Kenya compared to 47% who
think that one ethnic group, the Kikuyu, has more.11
30. Evidently, the meaning of power sharing under the National Accord has remained a
subject of controversy in the course of implementation. There is a growing perception that
one partner in the Coalition is not getting an equal share of power. It is also expected that
any future conflict is likely to stem from the sharing of senior public sector positions as
opposed to Cabinet positions. Ethnic sensitivity and equity in appointments is something
that Kenyans need to see happening.
Level of political cohesion
31. Political cohesion is a good measure of predicting the stability and effectiveness of
coalition governments. This is because such governments are brought together by a need
to develop a common policy (bipartisan policy) to deal with a national crisis. Public
interest, national unity and stability can override party differences. Political cohesion is
thus critical especially in relation to policies that have a bipartisan base. It entails
common policy positions on critical issues underlying the National Accord and high
levels of cohesion at both intra-party and inter-party levels.
32. The mandate of Kenya’s coalition government is very specific – spearheading reforms.
Therefore and as suggested by one analyst, the coalition cannot be treated as an ordinary
government. The conflicts witnessed within the Coalition Government, especially in the
last quarter of 2008 have resulted in many people losing confidence in its ability to
deliver reforms. For instance, only as few as 10% think the Coalition Government will
deliver a new constitution.
33. Responses are mixed on whether or not there has been political cohesion within the Grand
Coalition. One observation is that political positions on policy issues have remained
dynamic across the political divide. In the recent past, the most critical policy issues have
included the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry on
Post Election Violence (Waki Report) and those of the Independent Review Commission
on the General Election Held in Kenya in December 2007 (the Kriegler Report); the
establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission; constitutional
reforms, among others.
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Ibid.
Ibid.
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34. Between October and November 2008, it was almost certain that consensus would not be
reached on some of these issues. There were rifts between and within Coalition partners.
However, by early December 2008, there was already a shift that saw political
convergence in supporting some of these critical policy issues.
35. The political consensus can be attributed to three things. First, it was the political
leadership provided by the two principals and the newfound cohesion within the Kenya
National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) team. The team has been critical in
marshalling support for various legislations that would spearhead reforms to support the
National Accord. Second, public opinion at the time was mostly against those opposed to
reforms. Third, there was constant pressure from the international community and locally
to implement the Waki Report’s recommendations.
36. But there are also mixed signals on the level of political cohesion between the two
partners. It has regularly been reported that the two principals are always in consultation
on critical policy issues. However, many were left wondering when the President signed
into law the controversial Kenya Communication (Amendment) Bill, 2008, on December
30, 2008 despite the Prime Minister’s public assertion that he hoped the Bill would not be
assented to into law. This incident underscored the dynamics and the nature of the Grand
Coalition. It is also clear that it is principally through the goodwill of the two leaders that
the Coalition is kept on course.
37. Within political parties, ODM has been the most affected by internal dissent in recent
months. The Rift Valley region has not been particularly happy with the allocation of
Cabinet positions, the handling of the Mau Forest issue and the Prime Minister’s position
on the implementation of the Waki Report. As a result, in November 2008, some leaders
in the region threatened to lead the Kalenjin out of ODM.
38. We argue that ethnicity is the fulcrum around which conflicts of power within and
between parties revolves. Failure to manage ethnic-based politics may have destabilising
effects on all reform initiatives. If left unattended, ethnic-based interests will dilute
reforms to short-term gains.
39. The coalition government has declared 2009 as the year of reforms. This means that
nurturing political cohesion will be important during this period. Due to the mixed
political signals, almost 60% of Kenyans see the Grand Coalition as having a difficult
time working together. This is not a positive finding in light of the reform agenda for
2009 and the importance of positive public sentiment both in keeping the peace and
underpinning the reform momentum.

8

Coherence in decision-making
40. The level of decision-making on national policy issues in the recent past has been mixed.
We have noted tensions between the Office of the Prime Minister and that of the Head of
Public Service. Lack of coherence in the operations of the two offices has occasioned
open conflict.12 These conflicts tend to create a perception of a two-in-one-government.
This in itself also undermines conditions for political accountability, and it weakens
mechanisms for good governance and accountable decision-making.
Conflict management within the Coalition
41. As it has already been demonstrated, points of conflicts within the Coalition have been
many. The National Accord set out the principles of partnership in the Coalition
Government, which included constant consultation and willingness to compromise. There
was, however, no structure on how these would be achieved. The lack of a conflict
resolution mechanism has seen the stability of the Coalition come under threat on several
occasions. These conflicts are likely to deepen because there is no coalition agreement
signed by the two parties.
42. In May, 2008, it was reported that a joint team from all parties to the Coalition had
prepared a draft proposal for the creation of a Panel, which would act as a dispute
resolution mechanism for the Coalition.13 Although necessary for the management of the
Coalition, the document was never signed by the concerned parties.14 However, on
January 15, 2009, the Coalition partners established a Permanent Committee to manage
the affairs of the Grand Coalition.15 Each Coalition Partner has 6 representatives in the
committee. The shortfall of the committee is that it had no women – a shortcoming
quickly righted by naming two women to it. Some members of the PNU coalition have
dismissed the committee as non-starter because it is not representative enough.16
43. The creation of the Permanent Committee is just one step towards stabilising the
Coalition. It remains unknown how effective the team will be. It is important that a
written framework for managing the Coalition is prepared and signed by the partners.
There have been some positive comments on the contents of the initial draft prepared in
May 2008, which need to be taken into account. In the absence of an agreement, the
conflict will intensify and spill into the reform process.

12

Two recent examples include appointment of a team of election officials to guide the transition from ECK to an interim
body. The Prime Minister’s office observed that there were no consultations in doing so. Also, in October 2008, both offices
showed a lack of co-ordination in addressing allegations of abuse of office in NSSF.
13

Opiyo, D., 2008.New Rules to Govern Coalition Proposed. Daily Nation, 9 May.
PNU blamed ODM for not signing the document while ODM claimed that the document was not adequate. See Namunane, B., 2009. Top
Team to Mediate Coalition Wrangles. Daily Nation, 15 July. http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/515332/-/u1act3/-/index.html
15
Ibíd.
16
Standard Team, 2009. Team Set Up to Manage Coalition Affairs. The Standard, January 15. See
http://www.eastandard.net/InsidePage.php?id=1144004189&cid=4&
14
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Level of satisfaction with the Coalition Government
44. There is evidence that the level of satisfaction with the Coalition Government varies
across board. As far as the Coalition partners themselves are concerned, ODM seems not
to be completely happy with the relationship. On a number of occasions in the recent past,
ODM leaders have spoken of their frustrations in the Grand Coalition and how it had
slowed down the ODM agenda.17 The party has also raised concern over being treated as
“junior partners” by their PNU counterparts. Interestingly, the PNU side rarely complains
of similar issues. After reviewing its position within the Grand Coalition, ODM pushed
for the formation of the Permanent Committee as one way of addressing its concerns
within the Grand Coalition.
45. But most important is how the Grand Coalition and its institutions are perceived to be
functioning. Generally, approval ratings for most government institutions, including the
President and the Prime Minister, were high when the coalition was formed. This is
declining, however.18 The low scores are as a result of apparent laxity by the Coalition in
attending to immediate public concerns such as inflation, unemployment, and food
security, among others. In terms of service delivery, over 52% of Kenyans rate the
services received from their MPs, local authorities and central government as poor. There
seems to be a clear disconnect between what the public wants and what the leaders are
seen to be focusing on.
46. The manner in which the debate around the enactment of the Kenya Communication
(Amendment) Act of 2008 was handled; the refusal by MPs to pay taxes on their
allowances; the recent teachers’ strike; serious allegations of high-level corruption in the
maize and oil sectors; and the debate surrounding the powers of the Prime Minister versus
those of the Head of Public Service, are some of the issues that create the perception of a
lack of commitment by the Grand Coalition to reforms and the immediate needs of
Kenyans.
47. There is a need to restore confidence and faith in the Grand Coalition. The Grand
Coalition is seen as having forgotten that it is a government in transition with a specific
mandate of undertaking reforms. One analyst has suggested that the Coalition partners
have become comfortable with their positions in government and will do anything to hold
the Coalition together until 2012 - not in the public interest, but to serve political selfinterest. It is therefore upon the Coalition partners and other external actors to ensure that
short-term political interests do not stand in the way of the urgent reforms needed in the
country.

17

Ongiri, I., 2008. The Standard, December 19.

18

From the baseline survey the Prime Minister Odinga scores 59%, President Kibaki 43%, Cabinet 28%, Parliament 24%
and political parties 22%.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

48. It is almost a year since President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga signed the
agreement on principles of partnership of the coalition government. This agreement
provided for power sharing between the parties. The new structure of government may
not be a perfect model but it helped solve the political crisis at the time.
49. The National Accord is also significant as it provided a base to initiate comprehensive
reforms. This objective cannot be realised if there is no effective power sharing between
the Coalition partners. In a number of instances, the National Accord has been open to
different interpretations, which serve short-term political interests. This has been a source
of threat to the stability of the Coalition Government and even to reforms. It is however
possible to use the flexibility within the National Accord to advance its spirit.
50. Initiating reforms in all areas critical for stability and national unity should be prioritised.
The nature of reforms suggested under the Accord cannot be implemented, however, in
an environment where political competition is not guided by a national vision. This vision
cannot develop where short-term individual and ethnic interests guide decisions on
important national issues.
51. To rekindle confidence in the Government and public institutions, KNDR may need to
systematically and candidly debate the political challenges facing the coalition
government and advise on legal and political solutions. An impartial third party arbiter
may be important for this process.
52. On the whole, the coalition government presents the best opportunity to initiate and
complete comprehensive reforms due to the bipartisan policies in place. There may be
challenges in terms of how different institutions work together but there are opportunities
that simply must be exploited to move the country forward and away from the abyss into
which it was staring less than a year ago.
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Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project
Agenda Item 3
How to Resolve the Political Crisis
(Coalition Government/Power-Sharing)
Report on Status of Implementation
(Matrix on Progress)
OBJECTIVE
Real
Sharing.

Power

REQUIRED
ACTIONS
Facilitate real power
sharing to move the
country forward by
observing the
principles of portfolio
balance and relative to
parliamentary strength.

INDICATOR
Percentage
distribution of posts
between coalition
partners
(Number of
positions shared
between the
parties).

PROGRESS TOWARDS
OUTPUT
Position of Prime
Minister (ODM) and 2
deputies (ODM & PNU)
established through a
Constitutional
amendment and the
National Accord and
reconciliation Act in
March 2008.
A total of 92 ministers and
assistant ministers
appointed in April 2008 on
a 50:50 ratio
Cabinet positions left
vacant due to the death of (2
ODM) ministers and the
resignation of the Finance
Minister (PNU) in June
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REMARKS
There are challenges in the exercise of the Prime Minister’s
power due to apparent institutional conflict between the PM’s
office and that of the Vice President and Head of Public
Service.
The interpretation and application of the principle of portfolio
balance remains controversial with respect to high-level
government appointments. Constitutional reform can
effectively settle the controversies around power sharing.
Complaints about a lack of effective consultation on high-level
appointments remain a source of tension within the Grand
coalition.

OBJECTIVE

REQUIRED
ACTIONS

INDICATOR

PROGRESS TOWARDS
OUTPUT
2008 only filled in January
2009.
A number of permanent
secretaries, heads of
parastatals and ambassadors
appointed.

REMARKS

Level of political
cohesion

Levels of cohesion remain
unpredictable. The divisive
response to the Waki and
Kriegler reports (launched
in October and November
2008) illustrate simmering
levels of discord.
However, by December
2008 oppositionists
retracted and supported the
implementation of the
reports – allowing
important legislation to be
adopted.
Levels of intra- party
cohesion have been very
low especially within ODM.
59% of Kenyans assess the
Coalition as having a
difficult time working
together.
44% of Kenyans think
power is shared equally
between ODM and PNU
while 49% think power is

Political cohesion is critical for achieving reforms.
Mistrust among political parties, a lack of willingness to
implement reforms, and ethnic divisions are some of the
hindrances to political cohesion.
The political leadership of the two principals, effective
consultation, public and civil society pressure, and the
diplomacy of the international community are instrumental in
promoting cohesion on the reform agenda.
Destabilising factors such as ethnic tension and mistrust need
to be managed deftly to build a shared reform momentum.

% of public who
perceive real power
as being shared
(locally and
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Public perception on power sharing between the Coalition
partners has diminished drastically since the signing of the
Accord.
This is partly due to political bickering over appointments and

OBJECTIVE

REQUIRED
ACTIONS

INDICATOR
nationally).

Level of public
satisfaction in the
functioning of the
Grand Coalition.

Level of public
satisfaction in the
make up of public
sector positions.

Functioning
Public
institutions.

of

Partners commit to
govern together and
push through a reform
agenda for the benefit
of all Kenyans.

Levels of coherence
in decision-making.

PROGRESS TOWARDS
OUTPUT
not equally shared. 81% of
the 49% think PNU enjoys
more power.
34% of Kenyans also think
that the coalition partners
are not committed to
sharing power equally.
Approval ratings for most
coalition institutions has
dwindled almost a year
down the line. While
surveys in mid-2008 gave
approval rating of about
60%, rating for many
institutions in the Coalition,
the rating was below 50%
in December 2008.
Ethnicity remains an issue
in the demand for public
sector positions.
Only 37% of Kenyans
perceive that there is
equitable distribution of
civil service jobs (ministries
and parastatals).
47% think that one ethnic
group dominates.
Institutions for harmonised
decision-making such as
Cabinet sub-committees are
in place.
There are recurrent power
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REMARKS
the lack of cohesion within the coalition.

The low approval rating is a result of the perceived lack of
commitment by the Grand Coalition to meet the immediate
needs of Kenyans. The coalition needs to inspire public
confidence on delivery.

Balancing ethnic identity cannot be ignored in high-level
public sector appointments.

Redefine the role of the PM and the Head of Public Service to
avoid the apparent conflicts which are illustrative of
incoherence and undermine public confidence.
Coalition partners should adopt a structured approach to
enhance coherence in decision making; integrating mediation

OBJECTIVE

REQUIRED
ACTIONS

INDICATOR

% of public
satisfaction with
public service
delivery
Type of
consultative and
conflict resolution
mechanism in
place/used by
coalition partners

PROGRESS TOWARDS
OUTPUT
struggles between the
Office of the Prime Minister
and Head of Public Service
as to who does what, when.
Over 50% of Kenyans rate
service delivery by central
government, local
government and MPs as
poor.
For 10 months after
formation -- no structured
conflict resolution
mechanism in place. The
draft conflict management
agreement framework
prepared by May 2008 has
not been signed.
A Permanent Committee to
manage the affairs of the
Grand Coalition set up on
Jan 15, 2009.
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REMARKS
mechanism in all structures is critical

The Grand Coalition is in danger of losing the confidence of
Kenyans who appear to doubt that the Coalition partners are acting
in public interest.

KNDR team should finalise the conflict management
agreement and signature by partners.
The Permanent Committee perceived by some as not
representative and as not being gender sensitive.

